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The paper outlines 
b i l i t y  task derivation, 
i t y  milestones, re l iab i l  
loop ma~agement control 
ABSTRACT 
r e l i ab i l i ty  program control methods relating t o  rel ia-  
organizational r e l i ab i l i ty  responsibilities, rel iabil-  
. i ty organization manning, and the concept of closed- 
systems fo r  task implementation. 
Methods and techniques are discussed with particular attention t o  the 
Apollo spacecraft r e l i ab i l i ty  program. Typical problems encountered in  the 
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NASA policy d ic ta tes  that "every possible prac t ica l  means be emploTpd t o  
achieve high system r e l i a b i l i t y  a t  the e a r l i e s t  stage of system development." 
Frequent discussions of the disciplines required t o  assure re l i ab le  hardware 
have taken place over the  years by technical personnel. Inevitably, the  com- 
plexi t ies  of research an& development (R and D) programs can lead t o  "after- 
the-fact" r e l i a b i l i t y  programs i f  a t tent ion i s  not given t o  adequate control 
early i n  program development. For *his reason, r e l i a b i l i t y  program control 
methods were developed and used i n  the  Apollo spacecraft program with specific 
attention given to: 
1. Rel iabi l i ty  tasks based on NASA Rel iabi l i ty  Publication hW: 250-1 en- 
t i t l e d  "Reliabili ty Program Provisions f o r  Space System ~on t r ac to r s "  
2. Organizational r e l i a b i l i t y  responsibi l i t ies  
3. Rel iabi l i ty  outputs and milestones 
4. Rel iabi l i ty  manning incexes 
5. Closed-loop management control systems f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  task  imple- 
mentation. 
With the  recognition of r e l i a b i l i t y  as a vital factor  i n  the  development 
of the Apollo spacecraft, emphasis was placed on the accomplishaent of re l i a -  
b i l i t y  tasks on a timely basis. Particular at tent ion has heen given t o  first- 
a r t i c l e  high r e l i a b i l i t y  and t o  exploitation of man-in-t-he-loop. 
Organizational Responsibilities 
Since r e l i a b i l i t y  3zgmizations ha- many responsibi l i t ies ,  many of which 
appear r e d u n w t  ra ther  than supplementary, it was rnardatory t o  define the  rel- 
atiw responsibi l i t ies  of the  Apollo contractors t o  avoid potent ia l  management 
problems. 
Rel iabi l i ty  Funding 
The funding approach used i n  the A ~ o l l o  spacecraft r e l i a b i l i t y  program 
provides 8 r e l i a b i l i t y  budget fo r  only the r e l i a b i l i t y  organization. Th= in- 
t en t  is  t o  plan a t o t a l  r e l i a b i l i t y  program, with the  r e l i a b i l i t y  organization 
playing a "check-and-balance" ro le  t o  essure t h ~ t  r e l l i b i l i t y  disciplines am 
employed by a l l  organizat ions l  elements. 
. 
Mmagement Control Systems ., 
' _ 
. . With the  development of complex manned spacecraft, the requirement for  a r 
well-organized management becomes mandatory. Because poor comunications and .'. . 
.?.> 
, . 
lack of management control system can give rise t o  unreliable hsrdware, the - 4  
emphasis i n  Apollo spacecraft r e l i a b i l i t y  organizations has been t o  develop 
and maintain a system t h a t  enhances e f f i c ien t  dis tr ibut ion and analysis of b t a  
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Reliabili ty Ski l ls  
Although adequate prcgrem control measures are  essential  t o  a balanced 
re l i ab i l i ty  program, t h e .  importance of adequate s k i l l s  and a mcrtiwted staff 
cannot be overemphasized; because these are essential  t o  the development of re- 
l iab le  spacecraft. 
An amplification of the above points, and methods and techniques for  t h e i r  
imple~nta t ion ,  are  discussed i n  subsequent sect2ons of the paper. 
EmvEN BASIC RELIABILITY TASKS 
The need for  compatible r e l i ab i l i ty  program tasks was recognized. Basic 
r e l i ab i l i ty  tasks were developed using the NASA Reliabil i ty Publication NPC 250-1 
as a guideline. The derivation of these tasks, together with t h e i r  negotiation, 
has proven essential  t o  eff ic ient  communicatf s with the Apollo spacecraf't 
contractors, and in essence provides the f m w o r k  for  planning the ent i re  re- 
l i a b i l i t y  pzogram. A l l  of the  essential  r e l i a b i l i t y  disciplines are included 




Reliabil i ty progrm management 
Design specifications 
Reliabil i ty apportionment, gredict ion, and z s  sessment s 
Failure mode, effect  , and c r i t i c a l i t y  analysis 
Maintainability 
Design reviews 
Failure reporting and corrective actions 
Parts aud materials program 
Test planning and monitoring 
Reliabil i ty indoctrination and training 
Reliabil i ty documentat ion 
A basic task-by-task boilerplate narrative is provided the contractor f o r  
use as  a generic guide. &on! t h i s  boilerplate, a mutually acceptable revision 
is prepared by the Apollo spacecraft contractor within the framework of the 
above eleven tasks. These agreed-upon task descriptions are then used as the 
framework fo r  planning and implementing the Apollo spacecraft r e l i a b i l i t y  pro- 
gram. Table I simmarizes the major objectives of each of the eleven re l i ab i l i ty  
tasks. 
The Apollo spacecraft program philosophy stresses r e l i a b i l i t y  organization 
in-line participation and a "check-and-balance" role in  the accamplishment of 
these tasks. This role fo r  the r e l i a b i l i t y  organization has led t o  important 
inputs in to  the ultimate r e l i a b i l i t y  of the Apollo spacecraft. 
As  noted in table I, the tasks emphasize both qual i t r t ive  and quantitative 
disciplines. The Mmned Spacecraft Center has developed policies and guidelines 
tha t  minimize dependence on r e l i a b i l i t y  numerics alone. An example of t h i s  is 
the  emphasis placed on crew safety, where the policy i s  t o  design subsystems on t 
the basis that  "no single fa i lure  shall mean loss  of crew and no single failure ' 1  
shall be cause fo r  abort. " Application of t h i s  policy requires, during the de- '9' 
,$ 
sign process, a vigorous fa i lure  mode and effects  anays is ,  preparation of C - -. , 
r e l i a b i l i t y  models, and the  demonstration nonstatisticaJ.1.y of the  design ade- 
quacy via well-designed aad implemented test-and-failure-reporting and 
corrective-action programs. 
TECHNIQUE FOR OECAINING VISIBILrrY I N  ORGANIZATION mmnm IIESPONSIBILrrIES 
The complexities of the  Apollo spacecraft program have required the  devel- 
opment of management-type systems, agreed t o  and enforced by top management, 
f o r  assurance tha t  r e l i a b i l i t y  tasks are accomplished by responsible organiza- 
t ions  i n  an effect ive and timely manner. These system depend upon relative 
organizational responsibil i t ies.  Typical questions requiring answers are  posed, 
such as: 
1. Who is responsible fo r  implementation of the  task? 
2. Who shares task-responsibility from a participation standpoint? 
3. Who monitors the  execution or' esch task? 
4. Who assures t h a t  the  task is properly executed t o  obtain maximum 
re l i ab i l i t y?  
The answer t o  each of these questions varies from one Apollo contractor t o  
=other. For example, some contractor r e l i a b i l i t y  organizatims are  completely 
responsible f o r  t e s t  planning, whereas other contractor r e l i a b i l i t y  organiza- 
t ions  share t h i s  responsibi l i ty  with engineering. 4 matrix was developed t o  a id  
in  assigning responsibi l i t ies  ( table  11). It should be pointed out t ha t  the  re- 
sponsibi l i ty  assignments l i s t e d  are  typ ica l  ar,A vary among Apollo contractors. 
The preparation of a matrix similar t o  t h a t  shown i n  table  I1 is the i n i t i a l  
s tep  i n  the  development of management control systems t o  a s s i s t  i n  r e l i a b i l i t y  
task  execution and control. 
Assurance Responsibility 
The r e l i a b i l i t y  organization has "assurance responsibi l i t iest t  f o r  a l l  of 
the tasks (table 11). This requires an e f f i c ien t  and well-o~ypnized integrated- 
data-collection-and-analysis scheme t o  cope with other sections of the  organi- 
zation which are responsible f o r  separate but functionally in ter re la ted  hardware. 
Participation Responsibility 
Again, a s  was mentioned ea r l i e r ,  the  emphasis i n  the  Apollo spacecraft 
program i s  t o  u t i l i z e  the  r e l i a b i l i t y  organization i n  all in-line design and 
tes t ing  functions, and a t  the  same time t o  carefully avoid pre-empting specif ic  
responsibi l i t ies  of other organizations. This del icate  balance i s  typica l ly  
depicted i n  the  "participation role" shown in table  11. 
To further amplify t he  "participation role" indicated fo r  the r e l i a b i l i t y  
organization, reference i s  mde t o  table  I. Typically, the  r e l i a b i l i t y  organi- 
zation part icipates  i n  the  preparation of design specifications, hardware logic 
diagrams, failure-mode-and-effects enalysis, design reviews, failure reporting 
and corrective action, and t e s t  planning and monitoring. This part icipat ion 
i s  considered essent ia l  i n  achieving the desired check-and-balance type of re- 
l i a b i l i t y  program. 
Impleme~tation Responsibility 
The " implementation role" re la t ive  t o  Apollo coutractor r e l i a b i l i t y  organi- 
zations has typical ly been res t r i c ted  t o  specia l i s t  roles, such a s  parts  and 
materials, o r  t o  integration-type tasks, such as the  f a i l u r e  reporting and cor- 
rect ive action area with respect t o  system design and maintenance of closeout 
actions. Another example of an in-begration-type ro l e  i s  i n  the  assignment of 
r e l i a b i l i t y  f l i gh t  end-item project engineers whose responsibi l i ty  i s  t o  ensure 
at tent ion t o  individual f l i g h t  end-items by responsible organizational. elements, 
including the  r e l i a b i l i t y  organization. 
Monitoring Responsibility 
The "monitoring role'; is typica l ly  restricted. t o  those tasks where the  ex- 
peditious use of resources requires a less-than-full-time role, such as i n  the  
selective monitoring of tests by the  r e l i a b i l i t y  organization. 
FELIABILITY TASK PRODUCTS AND MILESTONE DERIVATION 
Table I11 lists r e l i a b i l i t y  tasks, typica l  outputs o r  products, and related 
milestones. These outputs must support the successful accomplishment of the 
prograa inilestones i f  the  r e l i a b i l i t y  program i s  t o  have impact. 
Table IV depicts these milestones f o r  a typ ica l  R an3 D program. The num- 
ber of r e l i a b i l i t y  milestones and t h e i r  interrelationships have l e d  certain of 
the Apollo contractors t o  employ management control systems, such a s  program 
eval-t ion review techniques (PERT), t o  a s s i s t  i n  the r e l i a b i l i t y  scheduling 
act ivi ty.  
Again, a s  was mentioned ea r l i e r ,  these milestones cannot be successfully 
accomplished without continuous interface w i t h  other responsible organizational 
elements. For th is  reason, i n  the  Apollo spacecraft r e l i a b i l i t y  program, strong 
emphasis i s  placed on the  data collection, analysis, and reporting scheme. The 
in tent  i s  t o  accomplish the  objective of taking in to  consideration all relevant 
information t o  maximize successful decision-mking. 
The complexities of the ApoUo spacecraft development program have led  t o  
the  requirement of key N. .~~/con t rac to r  review points. A discussion of these 
review points i s  beyond the  scope of t h i s  paper; however, they typica l ly  include 
evaluations a t  key design, t e s t ,  and vehicle f l i g h t  readiness points in the pro- 
gram. I n  addition t o  the design pol icies  indicated ea r l i e r ,  f i r s t - a r t i c l e  re- 
l i a b i l i t y  emphasis i s  enhanced by enforcing the NASA-Apollo spacecraft policy 
of not :r>mmitting spacecraft t o  f l i g h t  w i t h  unresolved fa i lures  o r  problems. 
The agreement on manning levels  fo r  r e l i a b i l i t y  program implementation can 
weU. be a stibject fo r  heated debate and negotiation between the customer and 
the  contractor. Several important ground rules  t h a t  a s s i s t  i n  minimizing dis- 
putes were used i n  the Apollo spacecraft r e l i a b i l i t y  program budget deter- 
mination: 
1. Rel iabi l i ty  responsibi i i t ies  delineated fo r  organizations other thau 
the r e l i a b i l i t y  organization are  not included i n  the r e l i a b i l i t y  budget. 
2. The r e l i a b i l i t y  organization i s  budgeted on the  basis of t h e i r  specific 
responsibil i t ies.  
3. Rel iabi l i ty  milestones are  used t o  jus t i fy  mnning levels  over the 
program span. 
Manning Ratios 
Using the  above grounc rules,  manning estimates with a firm basis  are  then 
ea s i l y  prepared. Apollo spacecraft program experience has shown tha t  the r a t i o  
of r e l i a b i l i t y  organization manning t o  t o t a l  engineering manning ranges from 
3 t o  5 percent. The specific values fo r  a glven Apollo contractor's r e l i a b i l i t y  
organization i s  very strongly influenceti by h i s  responsibil i t ies.  
Typical r e l i a b i l i t y  task manning values have been observed i n  the Apollo 
spacecraft program, a s  shown i n  table  V. The major manpower allocations are  t o  
the  r e l i a b i l i t y  program mnagement; r e l i a b i l i t y  apportionment, prediction, and 
assessmnt; fa i lu re  mode and effects  analysis; f a i lu re  reporting and corrective 
ac%ion; and t e s t  planning and monitoring tasks. 
Rel iabi l i ty  Organization and Sk i l l s  
Although a detai led discussion of r e l i a b i l i t y  s k i l l s  and organization is 
beyond the  scope of t h i s  paper, several important observations have been noted 
during the  conduct of the Apollo spacecraft program: 
1. Prime consideration was given t o  encourage the s tructure of the re l i a -  
b i l i t y  organization t o  preclude personnel specialization t o  analyt ica l  o r  t e s t  
a c t i v i t i e s  alone. Specialization of t h i s  type usually requires more manpower, 
added communications problems, and an organization ill-equipped t o  make e f f i -  
c ient  sh i f t s  with program development. 
2. Consideration was given t o  encourage the r e l i a b i l i t y  organization t o  
insure maximum f l e x i b i l i t y  i n  consonance with program phasing. For example, 
the  organization required f o r  the analyt ical  phase of the  program requires sig- 
nif icant  c b g e  when the program moves in to  the  hardware, test ing,  and opera- 
t iona l  phases. 
The acquisit ion of key technical s k i l l s  f o r  use i n  the  Apollo r e l i a b i l i t y  
organizations has proven d i f f i c u l t  due t o  competitive needs by other implement- 
ing pzr ts  of the contractor's organization. 
RElZABILITY W3AGEMEWl" CONTROL SYSTEMS 
The need f o r  a closed-loop management control system t o  assure timely and 
ef f ic ient  implementation of r e l i a b i l i t y  tasks cannot be overemphasized. Relia- 
S i l i t y  tasks, i f  effect ively implemented, -require closed-loop procedures as, 
his tor ical ly,  f a i lu re  reporting and corrective action systems are  designed t o  
insure t h a t  every f a i l u r e  have a specif ic  corrective action. 
The same philosophy can be applied equally t o  other tasks, such as fa i lu re  
mode and e f fec t s  analysis* In t h i s  instance every potent ial  f a i lu re  mode re- 
quires a clssed-loop corrective-action response, such a s  desige changes, tests, 
qual i ty  control procedures, or a combination of a l l  three corrective actions. 
Succeso trends can be used, such as: (1) number of crew safety single-point 
potent ial  f a i lu re  modes, (2) number of miss ion success single-point potent La1 
fa i lure  modes, and (3) number of fa i lu re  modes requiring additional qual i ty  con- 
tols .  Carrying t h i s  example further,  posit ive management procedures are thec 
designed t o  assiwe t h a t  the  fa i lu re  mode and e f fec t s  analysis is used to: 
(I) assist i n  proper disposition of hardware fai lurs ,  (2) prepare the  test pro- 
gram, (3) prepare r e l i a b i l i t y  predictions, (4) prepare maintainability analyses, 
and (5) part icipate  i n  design revicws. 
K?y Management Control Elements 
The management procedures described above, although re la t ive ly  simple, are 
extremely important t@ good r e l i a b i l i t y  program control, and should take cogni- 
zance of the  following four key elements: 
1. Relative organizational relationships (see table  11) 
2. Data collection and analysio requirements 
3. Closeout action requirements (closed-loop requirements) 
4. Trend indicators. 
For example, these procedures can readily be applied t o  f a i l u r c  reporting 
and corrective actton where the  organizational responsibi l i t ies  &re define& 
( table  11), the  data collection requirement i s  f u l f i l l e d  through pracedures re- 
quiring in-line test or qual i ty  c ~ n t r o l  functions t o  report  fai lures ,  3ho fa:' ,- 
ure analysis and closeout action i s  f'ulf i l l e d  by responsible organizations, tiild 
indicators, such as  the  number of open and t o t a l  f a i lu res  by age and by subsys- 
tem, a re  used. 
Typical Management Control Subsystems 
Table V l  summarizes typica l  management control sgstem needs f o r  r e l i a b i l i t y  
program control, based on the  four elements discussed above. It is important t o  
note t ha t  these management systems in te r re la te  with one another, and must be 
considered during t h e i r  design. 
Application of C' .~ed-Loop Management Procedures 
The application of closed-loop r e l i a b i l i t y  managemert procedures varies 
with specific contractors; however, a considerable number of successful proce- 
dures have been developed and used i n  the Apollo spacecraft program. 
STATUS OF APOLtO SPACECRAFT RELIABILITY PROGRAM 
The previous sections of the  paper b r i e f ly  outlined the  need f o r  r e l i ab i l -  
i t y  task definition, program control, and a balanced r e l i a b i l i t y  program. A 
natural  question t o  ask is, " H a t  has t h i s  approach worked on the  Apollo apace- 
c ra f t  program?" I n  general, the  approach has been successfully used. The fox- 
lowing i s  a br ief  discussion of some of the  implementation problems. 
Derivation of Reliabili ty Tasks and Organizational Interfaces 
In general, a l l  of the  kpollo spacecraft contrac4;ors have derived applica- 
ble versions of the re l iab i l i sy  tasks. No rea l  problems have arisen that  de- 
t a i l ed  discussions between customer and ractor did not eliminate. The 
aspect of scheduling outputs has, t o  the r e l i ab i l i ty  organization, had a tremen- 
d0us benefit in: (1) creating an awareness of the program needs on a timely 
basis, (2) acting as  a "forcing f'unction" on other organizations relative! t o  
interface-type tasks, and (3) insuring eff icient  manpower deployment. 
The technique for  displaying organizational responsibtli t ies has pr~rridrld 
benefit t o  organizations other than re l i ab i l i ty  i n  assisting in  the i r  under- 
standing of the i r  r e l i a b i l i t y  responsibilities. More effor t  is needed i n  th is  
area. An effective r e l i a b i l i t y  program cannot be implemented by a re l iab i l i ty  
organization alone. 
Reliabili ty Mmning 
As was stated previously, the re l i ab i l i ty  manning was just if ied on the 
basis of specific - l i ab i l i ty  organizational responsibilities. There are ap- 
proximately 500 r e l i ab i l i ty  personnel working on the ApoUo spacecraft program 
at both NASA and the prime contractors. In general, problems have not been 
caused by insufficient manning, but i n  the shortage of specific sk i l l s ,  such a3 
parts and materials specialists.  
Reliabili ty Task Implementat ion 
Although the implementation of the Apollo spacecraft r e l i a b i l i t y  prograin 
has had i ts  share of the normal R and D headaches, there appears t o  be motiva- 
t i o ~  t o  get the job done ir; a rel iable marlner. In comparison t o  other R and D 
program of similar complexity, the Apollo spacecraft program w i l l  leave a fine 
heritage for  R and D programs tha t  follow. 
CLOSING FEMmm 
The previous sections of the paper have pointed out: (1) the need for  task 
and milestone ideiitification, (2) the need for  management control system, 
(3) a recognl%ion of problems tha t  are a n o d  part  of complex R an3 D p? , ms. 
By and large, the Apollo spacecraft r e l i ab i l i ty  program has, t o  date, 
,.A .i" 
succesefully implemented and should s e m  i n  many respects as a pattern for %- , . 
Y .  
ture  R and D programs t o  follow. sz,;,,, 
' 
,b& .a 
" ',: A word of edvlce fo r  those working in  the r e l i ab i l i ty  f ield,  quoting the .>:ir ..- 3 + 
b t e  Chester Irving Bernard, "Your responsibili t ies are very much greater than 
authority. This l a  the general rule for  respoasible people, but you m y  
be misled by the cunant  damaging half-truth 'there can be no responsibility 
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'IWU3 I, RELXABIIZT!l TASKS VERSUS WI)R OBJTCTITJES 1 
I Task I k,ior obJ ect ives I 
1 1. Reliability program zamgemcnt 1-1 Program control systems 
1-2 Audits of ~~ocontractors 
1-3 Associate contractor suppcrt 
1-4 GFP control 
1-5 Heliability end-item8 project 
engineers 
1-6 Reliability plans 
- - - --- 
2. Design specifications 
- -  - - ~ 
2-1 Assure specification capable of meet- 
ing reliability requirementti 
2-2 Placement of numexrlcal WE other re- 
liability requirements 
3. Reliability apportiorrments , 
predictions, and assessments 
3-1 Reliability numerical apportionments 
3-2 Reliability numerical predictlone 
3-3 Reliability numerical assessments 
3-4 Preparation of reliability models 
I 4. Failure mode, effect, and 
I criticality analysis 
4-1 hilure mode and effect analysis by 
subsystem and end-item 
5, Maintzirabi lity 5-1 Operational reedices6 estimates 
5-2 Design provisions far fault isolation 
ar~d ease of mint ;name 
6. Design reviews 6 -  Preparaticn of de~ign review criteria 
6-2 Review of subsystem and oystem design 
at timely intervals using products 
indicated in other reliability tasks 
7. Failure reporting and correc- 
tive action 
7-1 Desim of Tailure-reporting system 
7-2 Failure reportil?~ 
7-3 Failure analysis 
7-4 Corrective action 
7-5 Derivation of failure trends 
8. Parts and materials program 
- - 
8-1 Parts and mahrlals specification 
8-2 Parts and materiala selection 
8-3 Parts and materia1.s handling and 
storage 
8-4 Parts and materials qualification 
lCAZaE I, - R E I U B I l X E  TASKS VEWUS MAJUR ORTECTTVB - Concluded 
fi 
mak 
9. Test planning and monitoring 
10, Reliability indoctrimstion 
and training 
ll, Reliability docmentation 
Major objectives 
9-1 Test plan3 
9-2 Test procedures 
9-3 Test implementation and monitoring 
9-4 Test reports 
- 
10-1 Program-oriented trairdng and motiva- 
tion program 
11-1 fieliability plan 
11-2 Reliability program statue reports 
11-3 F'ailure status reports 
11-4 ad-item reliabili-ty assessment 
reports 
11. - MATRIX OF mLIABn;m TASKS AM) 
O ~ T I O N A L  FEsPONSlB~mIES 
TYPICAL EXAMPLE 
Task Reliability Design Logistics Quality 
organization engineering control 
I  P M A  I P M A  I P M  A  I P M . A  
1. Reliability pro- 
gram management x x x I x 
2. Design specifi-  X X X X X X X 
cations 
3. Reliability appor- X X X X X 
tiorunent, predic- 
t ion and assesmnt 
4. Failure mode P . L ~  X X X X X 
effects  analysis 
(FMEA) 
- - - - . - - - - T 5. Binlainabi l i ty  X X X X X 
program 
6 .  Design reviews X X X X X 
7. Failure reporting X X X X X X 
and corrective 
act  ion 
8. Parts and X X X X 
materials program x. I 
9. Test planning and X X X  X X X X X 
monitoring 
10. Reliability in- X X X X X 
doctrinatim and 
training 
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TABLE V. = TYPICAL APOLIO SPACRCRAFT MANPOWER 
W A T I O N  PER RELIABILITY TASK 
f 
Task 
1. Reliability program management 
2, Design specifications 




3. Reliability apportionments , predict ion, and 
assessments 21 
4. Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) 7 
5, Maintainability 1 
6. Design . reviews . 3  
7. Failure reporting and corrective action 25 
8. Parts and materials program 7 
9, Test planning and monitoring 12 
10, Reliability indoctrination and training 1 
11. Re1iabili.w documentation 2 
Total 100 
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